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ABSTRACT 
With an increase in the creation and maintenance of personal websites, web content manage-
ment systems are now frequently utilised. Such systems offer a low cost and simple solution 
for those seeking to develop an online presence, and subsequently, a platform from which 
reported defamatory content, abuse and copyright infringement has been witnessed. This ar-
ticle provides an introductory forensic analysis of the 3 current most popular web content man-
agement systems available, Wordpress, Drupal and Joomla!. Test platforms have been cre-
ated and their site structures have been examined to provide guidance for forensic practition-
ers facing investigations of this type. Results document available metadata for establishing 
site ownership, user interactions and stored content following analysis of artefacts including 
Wordpress’s wp_users, and wp_comments tables, Drupal’s ‘watchdog’ records, and Joomla!’s 
_users, and _content tables. Finally, investigatory limitations documenting the difficulties of 
investigating WCMS usage are noted, and analysis recommendations are offered. 
 
KEYWORDS: Forensic science; digital forensics; Internet; web content management sys-
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Web Content Management Systems (WCMS) are systems designed to house and coordinate 
digital content online (1). Typically, these systems maintain two fundamental components, a 
front-end web interface and back-end content management facility, often database driven (of 
which types varying, depending on the platform). WCMS are an all-in-one, low cost and often 
non-technical service for an individual to tailor and build their own website or blog. As of 2016, 
statistics indicate that the three most popular WCMS available are Wordpress (2), Joomla! (3) 
and Drupal (4), with market shares of 60%, 6.5% and 4.6% respectively (and collectively 
71.1%) (5). Wordpress (6; 7) reports that in October 2016, almost 24 billion pages hosted by 
their services had been viewed, with over 65 million posts made to Wordpress sites and over 
11 million new pages created.  
 
An increase in WCMS pages coincides with an emerging blogging culture, with around 30 
million bloggers in the United States (US) alone (8). In the United Kingdom (UK), 1.25% of all 
Internet browsing equates to blog and personal website visits. With increasing popularity 
comes a potentially greater chance of abuse where self-hosted and personal website content 
may fall foul of many legal requirements, ranging from copyright infringement to offences 
against a person. Such instances include blogger arrests for exposing human rights violations, 
reported in 2008 (9). Since then, WCMS and personal sites have been linked to disputes 
around the world including the advertisement of professional assassins (10), the making of 
libellous comments (11), the making of grossly offensive (12) or political (13; 14) statements  
and extremism (15). In turn, WCMS are somewhat frequently exposed to targeted cyberat-
tacks, where in 2014, a reported 12 million Drupal sites were potentially compromised (16). In 
2016, it was reported that the Panamanian law, Mossack Fonseca data leak was attributed to 
an outdated version of Wordpress being utilised (17). 
 
WCMS provide a platform for individuals to post and express views and content which may 
not always sit within the bounds of existing legislation. Those whose actions overstep into 
illegality may find their site subject to investigation, requiring an understanding of the underly-
ing functions of WCMS, implementation methods and strategies for evidence acquisition and 
interpretation. This article provides an examination of the three most popular WCMS, namely 
Wordpress, Joomla! and Drupal, with a focus on establishing procedures for investigating 
WCMS which have been utilised for, or involved in content-based offences. This includes 
cases where a WCMS platform is both a victim (for example, subject to harassing comments) 
and an offender (to host and distribute illegal content). Available data for identifying suspect 
content and attributing this to an individual will be examined and technical issues are dis-
cussed. 
 
Regulation  
With over 3.5 billion internet users worldwide (18) and the majority of western civilization hav-
ing access to an Internet connection (19), developing and maintaining a personal website is 
now a relatively common practice. Many WCMS now provide built-in ‘turnkey’ solutions, re-
moving the difficulties traditionally involved in building a site from the ground up, increasing 
the accessibility of this task to those who do not maintain strong technical and coding skill 
sets. The creation of an accessible and indexable website can take minutes, with it’s purpose 
only limited to the imagination of the creator. Although WCMS maintain usage policies (see 
for example, Wordpress (20), Joomla! (21)) denoting the acceptable use of their platforms, a 
user may still opt to act in breach. In such instances, a site may remain active until reported 
(although there are automated copyright detection procedures (22)), at which point content 
may have been viewed, copied and distributed (indexed by search engines etc), beyond the 
control of the user.  
 
Regulation of online content on such platforms provides a continuous issue, highlighted by 
Google in regards to its Blogger platform where it is stated that content is not monitored to 
promote freedom of speech, and that users should try to settle disputes before taking formal 
action (23). Since 2013, 793 Wordpress sites were the subject of 482 government issued 
takedown requests, with only 23% of requests resulting in content or the site itself removed 
(24). Harvard University’s ‘Lumen Project’ provides an insight into the volume and type of 
takedown notices regularly submitted to regulate content online (25).  
 
Where a formal complaint has been lodged regarding a WCMS site, a post mortem investiga-
tion can be required to establish interactions with a website in question and content which has 
been posted. Identifying users, user accounts and their actions can support in establishing 
culpability. However, acquiring access to the requisite data to establish this information may 
not be straightforward in some instances. WCMS can be utilized both locally (local-hosting) 
and within cloud storage hosting systems online. Both pose regulatory issues and challenges 
to a forensic practitioner and the setup behind each method is discussed in turn. 
 
How do they work: local hosting 
The first option considered is for users to host their WCMS site locally. Some WCMS providers 
(see for example, Wordpress, Drupal and Joomla!) offer users the option to download a local 
version of their WCMS software and configure their site offline through the use of a server 
stack application (see for example MAMP (Mac) / XAMPP (Windows)). When complete, users 
can then locally host their site (or find a host, discussed in section Host Provider). To avoid 
the problems posed by dynamic IP addresses, a user can either purchase a static IP address 
or implement dynamic-DNS (DDNS) to make this option viable. Locally hosted sites pose the 
following advantages and disadvantages to practitioners investigating an incident related to 
the site hosted in this way. 
 
 Advantages: 
1. Configuration information for the WCMS is local and therefore potentially 
retrievable upon seizure and investigation of relevant equipment. 
2. As the user is responsible for the maintenance of their site, arguably may 
be an increased chance of backup and version control files being stored. 
This means that not only is there the potential to see the current site log 
files in operation, but also historical records which may document activity 
which has since been deleted or overwritten. This is beneficial as deleted 
data may not be retrievable from WCMS backend databases. 
3. There is no reliance placed on compliance from a hosting service to pro-
vide relevant information regarding a site for an investigation. 
 
Disadvantages: 
1. As all site data is local and controlled by a user, log / site data is vulnera-
ble to deletion or manipulation at any time. If a site suspect believes that 
they are under investigation, the time taken for law enforcement to seek 
necessary legal authority to seize and investigate equipment may prohibit 
an investigation as content can be removed at any time in absence of any 
preservation request facilities.  
2. Conversely, whilst the presence of back-ups is noted above as an poten-
tial advantage, such processes may not always take place (or partial, in-
effective or incomplete back-ups may be taken) where a user carelessly 
maintains their site. In such cases, the automatic back-up processes 
which may be offered by a provider could offer a greater source of evi-
dence in some cases. Similarly, poorly documented version control may 
also pose an investigatory concern in terms of interpreting site content 
and structure. 
3. A locally hosted site also means dealing with a users personal hardware 
and software configuration during an investigation. This may be bespoke, 
historical, or lack sufficient documentation regarding the setup posing a 
challenge to the practitioner as they attempt to maintain evidential integ-
rity.  
4. Access to data can in some cases be an issue where a user has imple-
mented local security and data protection measures such as disk encryp-
tion. In such instances, decryption content or suspect password disclo-
sure may pose an issue, where co-operation from a WCMS provider may 
prove more successful.  
5. Data may be more volatile, where a suspect at any point can take down 
a hosted site or content and securely delete it. In such instances, WCMS 
sites hosted by a service may maintain records of usage for short periods 
beyond an initial deletion point.   
 
Host provider 
A WCMS hosted through a dedicated provider poses additional practitioner challenges. Some 
WCMS providers offer a built-in hosted solution (for example, Wordpress a hosted option via 
wordpress.com as well as the Wordpress software for local download and configuration from 
wordpress.org). Where a host is utilised, website information typically resides on the host's 
server and where access to it is needed as part of an investigation, a providers compliance to 
disclose information regarding a site under investigation must be sought. Compliance provides 
the main potential barrier to an effective investigation of this type where necessary legal pro-
cedures must be adhered to potentially facilitate access to content. Where site information is 
disclosed, exported formats may vary ranging from full back-end database disclosures to xml 
output describing a sites structure and content (see Wordpress’s turnkey hosted site export 
option). 
 
Providers 
The following sections provide an examination of Wordpress, Drupal and Joomla!, analysing 
core database structures which maintain information about what is stored on a site, user ac-
counts and user interactions.  
 
Wordpress 
Wordpress is the most popular WCMS system currently available and is the first to be ana-
lysed. Where a user has locally hosted or utilised a hosting service, the Wordpress site data-
base is often a fundamental source of information for interrogation, and access to it is required. 
However, depending on the hosting method, access to it may not be straightforward, as noted 
above. Most hosting services allow a site database to be extracted from the hosting site for 
purpose of backup retention and therefore in some cases, even sites hosted using a hosting 
service may still have copies of the site data stored locally (see for example 
‘www.000webhost.com’ which was utilised as a host during the test creation and examination 
of a Wordpress website). When a site is developed and hosted locally, the sites database is 
likely be resident on local storage media. 
 
As a starting point for analysis, reference should be made to the Wordpress entity relationship 
diagram (ERD) (26). ERDs describe the relationships between entities, which in the case of 
relational databases are table fields, and objects, essentially additional tables within the over-
all database. The Wordpress ERD provides an overview of table metadata types and relation-
ships, supporting an effective examination of this content. The main Wordpress (version 4.9.1) 
WCMS database contains 12 tables. In regards to site usage, the following entries have been 
highlighted as they provide potentially evidential content.        
 
Website Users 
One of the first steps to investigating a hosted website lies with the identification of who has 
access to the site, usable accounts and the privileges which are assigned to these accounts. 
To start gathering this information, the wp_users table should be interrogated where those 
who have created an account on the site and their registration metadata are provided  (see 
Table 1).  
 
Table 1: A breakdown of the wp_users table (relevant fields only). 
 
Combine this information with the wp_usermeta table and privilege information can be gleaned 
for each account. Correlating the ID from table wp_users to user_id in the wp_usermeta table, 
levels of privilege given to each user can be established. The meta_key (wp_capabilities field) 
and associated meta_value entries denote the privilege status of each user. 
 
Privileges include ‘subscriber’, ‘author’, ‘contributor’, ‘administrator’ and ‘editor’. The role at-
tributed to each individual can impact the availability and integrity of poster information. Ad-
ministrator roles have full access and control over the site, editors have the power to publish 
and manage all posts and authors can publish and manage their own posts. Contributors and 
subscribers can be considered minor roles and do not have the ability to publish their own 
content (27). Establishing the privileges associated to an account may narrow-down an inves-
tigation by helping to establish those who have the ability to post offending content, however 
it must be noted that signup credentials associated to an account may not be a reliable method 
of physically identifying an offender (the use of real names for sign up is unlikely where an 
individual intends to commit an offence). Identifying a physical user from account details as-
signed to a user of a WCMS site will arguably in most cases be limited to establishing the 
owner of an email account used as part of any WCMS signup processes by contacting the 
email addresses originating email service provider (Google, Microsoft etc.). Although valida-
tion of accounts is improving, such services are themselves not immune from the creation of 
fake, potentially untraceable accounts. In addition, where an offender registers a Wordpress 
account with an email account utilising fake details, identification may not be possible. 
 
In addition to identifying accounts, where content has been posted in breach, establishing the 
user account which has posted the content is important. 
 
Pages, Posts and Comments 
A created and customised Wordpress site can take many forms, however, standard content 
containers are provided (pages / articles). Depending on the purpose of the site, it may contain 
few (synonymous with blogs) or many page artefacts. An account with appropriate privileges 
can create a new page. On each page, an account with appropriate privileges can post con-
tent. Subsequent viewers of content can make comments, where an account is not required, 
simply the submission of a name and email address along with the comment text. All of these 
actions maintain metadata within the wp_posts and wp_postmeta tables. 
 
The wp_posts table describes posted content within the site (pages / articles, not comments), 
with Table 2 identifying the potentially evidential fields. 
 
Table 2: wp_posts table (relevant fields only). 
 
Comments  
Those utilising a Wordpress site for the purpose of blogging or interaction with others online 
can provide a comments facility. Those logged into the site (with accounts) can comment on 
content and if the page/post if public facing, passive visitors can submit comments, providing 
they submit their name and email address (these are however not validated) as part of the 
comment submission process. Information surrounding comments is stored within the 
wp_comments table (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: wp_comments table. 
  
Additional information regarding deleted comments is stored in the wp_commentmeta table, 
described below in Table 4. 
 Table 4: wp_commentmeta table. 
 
Items which are removed from the trash are permanently deleted tests showed they were not 
recoverable from the site database using forensics methods. By default, Wordpress does not 
have any default version control systems (although plugins may offer this functionality, see for 
example ‘VaultPress’ (28)) therefore content subject to deletion may not be be stored else-
where. 
 
Evidential considerations 
The Wordpress database maintains metadata documenting website interactions and con-
struction of elements. One of the main challenges facing the forensic practitioner is acquiring 
access to this database, and this depends on the hosting strategy. If hosted locally, using 
Wordpress software, the database should also be stored on the local drive in the site directory 
of the server stack application in use (see for example, Applications/MAMP/db, the default 
installation for MAMP server stack on the Macintosh platform). The availability of this database 
for those who host Wordpress sites using hosting services with built-in Wordpress develop-
ment suites may prove troublesome, with four areas to be considered. 
 
1. Backups: Most hosting services provide a backup functionality whereby users can ex-
port their website database and store this content locally. Export formats may vary and 
it is not necessarily the case that exported site databases will remain in SQL format 
(exports include .xml, .csv etc.). In the case of ‘www.000webhost.com’ (a chosen test 
host with built-in Wordpress turnkey solution which offers a free site development and 
hosting option), a full sql export from phpMyAdmin is possible. 
2. Identifying the host: Typically, hosting vendors offering a free service will provide a 
URL with the host provider’s identifiable service included (for example, 000webhost 
provides a free service where site URLS are typically formatted as 
‘https://testsite.000webhostapp.com’). This can allow host identification in order to re-
quest the extraction of data regarding a site under investigation. 
3. Cooperation: If the hosting service can be identified, access to the site configuration 
content is subject to their willingness to cooperate.  
4. Comment edits: Unlike with posts, there is no record of edited comments. Tests 
showed it was not possible to detect which comments had been edited and by whom, 
using data contained within the site database. 
 
Plugins 
Wordpress maintains in excess of 47,000 plugins, downloaded almost 1.5 billion times, each 
offering the ability to extend the basic function of a Wordpress site (29). The problem posed 
by plugins lies with the variety of ways in which they store and maintain their data. Some 
plugins simply utilise the main site database to house information (see ‘bbPress’, a forum 
application for example) whereas others may function separately to this or not log information 
at all. Providing an analysis of the functionality of all available plugins is beyond the scope of 
this work, with each needing to be examined on an individual basis. Suggestions for analysis 
involve targeting plugins based on popularity and those likely to be involved with commonly 
occurring offences on these platforms.   
 
Drupal 
Unlike both Joomla! and Wordpress, Drupal does not offer a complete hosting solution (how-
ever hosting providers such as ‘pantheon.io’ do provide a turnkey solution). Typically, users 
download the Drupal software, configure and develop the site locally then either locally host it 
or identify a hosting service to upload their site to. As with Wordpress, the site database main-
tains a comprehensive record of content and interactions, and should be the starting point of 
an investigation into a Drupal site and forms the focus of the investigation presented in this 
article. The main Drupal (version 8) site database consists of 67 tables, with the following 
analysis focusing on content relevant to denoting user interactions and posted content follow-
ing a test examination of a local Drupal site.  
 
Identifying users 
In order to identify website account holders, the users_field_data table maintains a record of 
the logged in users (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5: users_field_data table. 
 
In addition to account information held in the users_field_data table, the user_roles table de-
notes the privileges attributed to each user account. Tying the entity_id in the user_roles table, 
to the uid in the users_field_data table, the name of the account can be identified (see FIG. 
1). 
 
FIG. 1- The user_roles table showing administrator privileges assigned to accounts 1, 
3 and 5 (shown in entity_id, matched with uid in users_field_data table).   
 
Drupal maintains 3 privilege levels, ‘anonymous user’, ‘authenticated user’ and ‘administrator’. 
By default, anonymous users can only view comments. Authenticated users have permission 
to post, and administrators have global access for complete configuration of the site. These 
permissions are flexible and therefore an administrator can expand the range of privileges that 
any user maintains. 
 
Posted content 
When analysing the content posted to a Drupal site, the node_field_data table provides a 
starting point for analysis (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: node_field_data table. 
 
*Note: The node_field_revision table (see FIG. 2) maintains a record of changes to an article. 
The title field demonstrates changes to the article title. Changes to an article content are rec-
orded in the  node_revision_body table. Matching the vid and revision_id values will identify 
the changed pages and additional content added / removed (see FIG. 3). 
 
FIG 2- An edited article entry in the node_field_revision table. 
 
FIG 3- An edited article entry in the node_revision_body table. 
 
Tracking post edits: Where posts have been edited, it may be necessary to identify both the 
originating author and the editor, particularly where posted or edited content is in breach of 
law in order to attribute liability. Using the revision_id, matching this value to the corresponding 
vid entry in the node_revision table will allow the investigator to establish the uid of the account 
undertaking the revision and the timestamp the revision was made. 
 
Comments 
Similar to posted content, those with appropriate privileges can comment on website articles. 
Posted comment information is stored in the comment_field_data table (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7: comment_field_data table. 
 
Establishing what the comment was involves an interrogation of the comment_comment_body 
table (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8: comment_comment_body table. 
 
Note: Unlike posts, when comments are edited, the site database does not keep a strict log of 
changes. The watchdog table (see section Watchdog Table) does record events such as ed-
ited comments but there is limited information available to tie the revision to the event docu-
menting the content of the comment before the edit took place.  
 
Watchdog Table 
The watchdog table provides an overview of actions carried out on the site itself, akin to a 
system log (see FIG. 4). These actions are chronologically ordered by the wid entry. The uid 
specifies the account triggering an event and the message denotes the event type. Of partic-
ular interest, the message field identifies when site content is deleted (‘@type: deleted). The 
Drupal WCMS, unlike Wordpress and Joomla! does not (following testing) operate a trash 
functionality, therefore content which is deleted is not temporarily kept in this holding con-
tainer. As a result, the watchdog table maintains the only record of acts of deletion (see FIG. 
4). The binary large object (BLOB) data type allows binary data to be stored as a single entity. 
Through an analysis of the BLOB data, metadata surrounding the deletion can be ascertained. 
For example, the BLOB entry for a deleted ‘article’ with the title ‘6th page’ is recorded as 
‘a:2:{s:5:"@type";s:7:"article";s:6:" %title";s:8:"6th page";}’. The hostname field identifies the 
IP address of the account and timestamp identifies the time and date when the event took 
place (which in the case of an event denoting the deletion of content, the  timestamp entry 
shows the time of deletion). 
 
FIG. 4- Deleted entry in the watchdog table. 
 
Note: The number of log records maintained can be adjusted within the settings of the site 
(‘Configuration’ -> ‘Logging and Errors’ settings). By default, 1000 are maintained, but this can 
be limited to 100 or expanded to all messages. Therefore the volume of information which can 
be obtained from the watchdog table may vary and is subject to user changes. When a log 
reaches its maximum size it operates on a first in first out basis, where initial records are 
deleted (new events will continue to receive a wid value which increments past the maximum 
log value as earlier ones are deleted). The maintenance of log watchdog entries is initiated by 
‘cron’, a Drupal automated task scheduler process. This can be set to run between every 1 
hour to 1 week, never or can in cases be manually initiated by a user. Following testing, the 
watchdog log entries can exceed their maximum log size (where max 100 was set, over 100 
records were initially stored), until a cron process is initiated. If cron is disabled, then watchdog 
records may be kept beyond log limits during this period, but further exhaustive testing over 
long-term usage of a site would be needed to determine this possibility. 
 
Tracking users 
Tracking interactions with the website can help to timeline specific events which have oc-
curred. The sessions table provides information of the last account to be signed into the site. 
The IP address of the account is provided in the hostname field and timestamp provides the 
login time. Once the user is logged out, the session entry is removed from the sessions table, 
therefore the availability of this data depends on the point in which the database structure for 
the website was captured. In addition, the watchdog table maintains records for the opening 
(Session opened for %name.) and closing of (Session closed for %name.) account login 
sessions. An examination of the uid or BLOB entries for such events identify the name of the 
user (here, entry for account ‘root5’ login is shown:- a:1:{s:5:"%name";s:5:"root5";}). The 
associated timestamp documents the time of the event. As discussed above, there is no spe-
cific log entry for edited comments, but by establishing the user account logged in at the time 
of the edit (providing they have sufficient account privileges) can identify the editor.  
 
Joomla! 
As with Wordpress, Joomla! offers a hosted solution with a site URL containing a Joomla! 
domain suffix (for example, https://testsite1234.joomla.com/), or the Joomla! software can be 
downloaded locally for local configuration before hosting. Regardless of which option is cho-
sen (Joomla’s hosted option and local download were utilised in testing), access to the site’s 
underlying database offers the ability to identify site-usage events. The Joomla! (version 3.6.4) 
site database by default maintains 68 tables containing site usage information with the re-
mainder of this section highlighting relevant entries.  
 
Users  
Identifying the users involved in the website’s maintenance and interactions involves initial 
analysis of the _users table (see Table 9). 
Table 9: _users table. 
 
Once accounts have been established, privilege information requires interrogation of the 
_user_usergroup_map and the _usergroups tables. Mapping the account id to the group_id 
and then group_id to parent_id, the different roles of the account can be seen in the 
_usergroup table. Each user profile can maintain multiple roles as shown with account id ‘779’ 
(in FIG. 5 and 6). As with the Wordpress and Drupal, roles dictate the actions which a user 
can carry out on the site.   
 
FIG. 5- The _user_usergroup_map table showing user 779 with role id’s 2, 3 and 4. 
 
FIG 6- The _usergroup table showing user 779 (as shown in FIG. 5, with role id’s 2, 3 
and 4).  Here, associating the group_id (from _user_usergroup_map table) to the par-
ent_id (from _usergroup table) will reveal the roles which an account has, in this case 
‘Author’, ‘Editor’ and ‘Publisher’. 
 
Site content 
Establishing content on the site involves interrogating the _content table (see Table 10).  
 
Table 10: _content table. 
 
 
As with Drupal (discussed in section Tracking users), Joomla! maintains a record of active 
login sessions in the _session table. Here the time field denotes the login time, where the 
userid can be correlated with the _users table to establish the user accounts logged in. Fol-
lowing testing, _session table entries appear to be dynamic, and therefore if no one is logged 
into the site at the time of analysis (of export of the site database, this table will be empty). 
Unlike Drupal and Wordpress, Joomla! articles cannot be commented upon, and therefore 
those wanting to interact with the site must create an account and post an article.   
 
Extensions 
The Joomla! (30) extension directory  currently maintains 7822 extensions (analogous to 
plugins in Wordpress) which can extend the functionality of site, with the overall number of 
extensions likely to be far greater when 3rd party vendor sites are considered. As with the 
issues noted above in section Plugins, extensions may utilise current back-end database 
structures to store configuration information, but each extensions must be examined on an 
individual basis.    
 
Concluding analysis 
This article provides an introductory analysis of WCMS sites and available evidence for es-
tablishing standard site interactions and setup. In the case of all three of the WCMS analysed, 
the WCMS databases offer a primary source of information from which to commence an in-
vestigation involving a WCMS site. Acquiring access to it can help a forensic practitioner to 
establish which user accounts have access to, and have been involved in the creation of con-
tent on the site. Where a site is locally developed or hosted, the local WCMS configuration 
and setup must be identified an examined. In the cases of the WCMS examined in this article, 
site structural information and interaction data is provided by each sites underlying database 
and configuration files where their location on a system will be subject to the WCMS package 
in use and server stack or associated applications being ran. Where a hosted option is pre-
ferred, access to site data (exported site content and associated database) is subject to a 
vendor’s terms and conditions, and legal authority to request disclosure. From the analysis 
carried out, the following points must be considered. 
 
1. The site databases for Wordpress, Drupal and Joomla! do not track site revisions in 
significant detail. The result of this means that where a post has been made and then 
subsequently edited, revision history beyond the time and date of a revision is limited 
(subject to the use of version control plugins). The problem this poses is where derog-
atory or malicious comments / posts have been made and edited, original posted con-
tent may not be viewable leading to difficulties in establishing a chain of amendments.  
Similarly, the speed at which content may be made available then removed places a 
greater emphasis on the ‘live analysis’ of a website to ensure all available records of 
an event are taken whilst this information is still available. 
2. Similar to the issue noted above, if content is deleted from the site (and also from any 
built-in trash function), records of deleted content may no longer be available. There-
fore where an administrator account removes any violating content before recording a 
backup of the site database and content, it may not be possible to identify the physical 
poster of any illicit content. If site artefacts are stored on a local machine, forensic 
analysis of file system artefacts (for example, volume shadow copies) may reveal 
some historic version information which has been passively recorded by the operating 
system, but this is not guaranteed.  
3. The acquisition of an account holder’s IP address may be the only method of identify-
ing a suspect in cases of investigating illicit posts. However, by default, only Drupal 
and Wordpress recorded this data during testing, where Joomla! sites would require 
the use of an additional plugin.  
 
Given the prominence of WCMS usage, such systems must consider the impact of abuses 
and look to build in methods of assigning accountability to those who misuse these platforms. 
As can be seen via testing, although there are methods for tracking user interactions with a 
WCMS site, greater detail will support investigations where in-depth dedicated session man-
agement information would support any examination of specific illegal acts and  their associ-
ated user account. Whilst the tested platforms provide metadata supporting the ability to link 
comments/added content to an account, it is the ability to then attribute the account to a phys-
ical user which is potentially the greatest challenge. IP address information (despite being 
vulnerable to spoofing / anonymising protocols) is arguably one of the most valuable sources 
of information and its potential adoption by all WCMS to attribute site actions would be of 
benefit to law enforcement.  
 
Future work 
To further this research, future work should include the examination of additional WCMS plat-
forms. Despite this article targeting the three most popular WCMS, covering a combined 71% 
market share, remaining vendors need to be analysed. Further, the article provides an over-
view of standard WCMS functionality, and further research should involve a targeted investi-
gation into relevant WCMS plugins. 
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Table 1: A breakdown of the wp_users table (relevant fields only). 
Field Description  
ID An integer value assigned to each user account. This value can be used 
to uniquely identify their actions on the site. 
user_login A string value representing the account holder’s chosen username.  
user_registered This is the date and time that the account was created. 
user_pass Encrypted account password using PHPass. 
user_email The email account used to register the account. The email is not verified. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: wp_posts table (relevant fields only). 
Field Description 
ID The ID column provides a chronological order of posted entries. An 
ID is given to each individual post. Where the sequence is out of or-
der (for example, 1,2,4), an entry has been removed from the table 
(i.e. a post has been deleted from the site, in this example, ‘3’).  
post_author The post_author field denotes the author of a post. 
post_date & 
post_date_gmt 
Time and date information that the post was made. 
post_content This field contains the content of the post. This will vary depending 
on the type of post made (see post_type field below). 
post_title Title of post. For example, if post is the creation of a new page, the 
title of that page is recorded here.  
post _status & com-
ment_status 
post _status indicates the accessibility of the post. For example, 
whether it is ‘private’ or ‘public’; accessible by viewers.  
post_modified & 
post_modified_gmt 
The time and date of post, if edited. If the post has not been edited, 
these values will match the post_date and post_date_gmt. 
guid URL of site page where content is contained. 
post_type This field indicates the type of post made. Entries include page (cre-
ation of a site page), post (post made to page), forum & topic (crea-
tion of forum structures on the site and posts made to the forum) 
and revision (edited content). In cases of post revisions, an associ-
ated post_parent field within the table denotes the ID field (noted 
above) of original post from which the edit was made. (for example, 
if post ID 10 is a revision of post ID 4, post_parent if ID 10 will have 
a value of 4). This allows the tracking of revisions on a post over a 
period of time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: wp_comments table. 
Field Description 
comment_ID A chronological list of comments made on the site. Where the 
numeric sequence is out of order, a comment has been de-
leted from the site (same as the ID field discussed in Table 2). 
comment_post_ID This is a numeric identifier for the post that the comment has 
been made on. This entry should be matched against the ID 
field in the wp_posts table (shown above in Table 2) to identify 
the original post containing to the comment. 
comment_author Name of the commenter. 
comment_author_email Email account associated to the commenter. 
comment_author_IP IP address of the commenter. Given that no validation is car-
ried out on other commenter details, this may be important 
when trying to attribute offending comments to a physical indi-
vidual.  
comment_date & com-
ment_date_gmt 
The date and time that the comment was made. 
comment_content The content of the comment. 
comment_approved Status of the comment. The value will be ‘0’ if it has not re-
ceived approval status from an account with the necessary 
privileges. If value is ‘1’, the comment has been approved. 
Where the value is ‘trash’, this represents a deleted comment 
and further information is stored in the ‘wp_commentmeta’ ta-
ble (discussed below in Table 4). 
comment_agent Metadata surrounding the commenter’s platform (i.e. browser 
type/version and device type/operating system). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: wp_commentmeta table. 
Field Description 
comment_id This is a numeric value identifying the deleted comment. Match this 
value to the comment_ID in the wp_comments table to establish fur-
ther metadata about the deleted comment. 
meta_value Where this value equals ‘1’, the comment is in the ‘trash’. Each com-
ment in the ‘trash’ has a corresponding _wp_trash_meta_time entry. 
This is a Unix timestamp, which when converted corresponds to the 
time which the comment was deleted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: users_field_data table. 
Field Description 
uid This is a unique numeric value assigned to an account on the web-
site. This value can be used to associate actions carried out on the 
site to a specific user account, for example, what content they have 
posted content. 
name This is the username assigned to the account. 
mail This is the email address used to sign up for the account. No valida-
tion is carried out on the account and this could be fake. In turn, it is 
not a requirement for account holders to input an email address, 
therefore this information can be omitted on signup. 
created This is the date and time that the account was created. 
login This is the last sign-in of the account. 
changed This is the time and date the user's profile settings were opened. 
The timestamp changes even where the settings have not been ac-
tually updated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: node_field_data table. 
Field Description 
uid This is a unique numeric value assigned to an account on the web-
site (the same as in the users_field_data table). This is used to at-
tribute posted content (pages, articles) to a user. 
type For example, an ‘article’ or ‘page’. 
title The title of the article / page. 
created This is the created time and date of the posted content, stored as a 
Unix timestamp 
changed This is the time and date of the last time the posted content was ed-
ited,stored as a Unix timestamp 
nid A second identifier tied to a post. Match the nid value to the nid 
value in the history table to establish the last time a post was viewed 
(stored as a Unix timestamp). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: comment_field_data table. 
Field Description 
uid This is a unique numeric value assigned to an account on the web-
site. This is used to attribute posted comments to a user. 
subject This is the name of comment (subject). 
email The email address of the account posting the comment. 
created The created time and date of the comment. 
changed The time and date of last edit on the comment. 
cid Unique ID of the comment. Link this ID with entity_id in com-
ment_comment_body table (below, Table 8) to identify the actual 
content of the comment. 
hostname Hostname of the commenter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: comment_comment_body table. 
Field Description 
comment_body_value Content of the comment. 
entity _id Unique identifier of the comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: _users table. 
Field Description 
id This is a unique numeric value assigned to an account on the web-
site.  
username Username of the account. 
email The email address used to sign up for the account. No validation is 
carried out on the account and this could be fake. 
registerDate The date and time of the account creation. 
lastvisitDate The date and time of the last sign-in of the account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: _content table. 
Field Description 
id This is a unique numeric value assigned to a created article. Where 
these values are out of sync (as demonstrated with Wordpress), an 
article has been deleted. 
title The title of the article. 
introtext The content in in the article. 
created The date and time of the article’s creation. 
created_by The id (see _users table) of the account creating the article.  
modified The date and time of the article’s last modification. If no modification 
has taken place since it was originally posted, this field will reflect 
the same date and time as in the created field.  
modified_by The id (see _users table) of the account who has modified the arti-
cle. This field will be blank if it has never been modified. 
version This value indicates the number of edits that the article has under-
gone. 
hits This value shows the number of visits to the article’s page (page 
views). 
state The state value identifies the current state of content. Where this 
value is ‘-2’, the content is deleted and in the trash. 
 
